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Analytic Narratives
Revisited
We welcome the animated debate raised by Analytic Narratives concerning
socialscientiﬁcmethodsandthescopeofrationalchoice.Advocatesofmathe-
maticalandrationalmodelshavelongclaimedtheyhavemuchtotellusabout
situations where behavior can be quantiﬁed or where the situation under
study recurs many times. However, it was thought impermissible for ratio-
nal choice theories (and rational choice) to venture into the analysis of big
events.PoliticalscientistslikeGaryKing,RobertKeohane,andSidneyVerba
Social Science History 24:4 (winter 2000).
Copyright © 2000 by the Social Science History Association.
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8686 Social Science History
(1994) implicitly conceded the issue by concentrating on the problem of case
selection when the number of cases is small but greater than one.We believe
unique events are too important to leave aside, and we use rational choice,
particularly game theory, as a means to study unique events.
AsymposiumonANisadiﬃcultexercise.Thewritingofanalyticnarra-
tives is still in its infancy, and the topics and aims of thevolume range across
disciplines and over more than a millennium.The commentaries by Daniel
Carpenter,SunitaParikh,andThedaSkocpolreﬂectapatienceandopenness
that we can only applaud. Overall they agree on the merits of the enterprise
but debate the nature, relevance, and extensiveness of our contribution.The
question that we must therefore confront is not whether to craft analytic nar-
ratives but what constitute the standards for research in this vein.
Ourcriticsperceptivelyindictusforanumberofmisdemeanorsandper-
haps even a few felonies. To most of Carpenter’s, Parikh’s, and Skocpol’s
charges we plead guilty with honor. Rather than responding to each of their
criticismsindividuallywerecognizethattheyfundamentallyconcernfouris-
sues:(1)DoesANactuallydeliverwhattheintroductionpromises?(2)Where
isthenarrative?(3)Whereistheanalyticalmethod?(4)Howdowetransform
an approach to problems into a research area in social science?
Moving from the Introduction to the Cases
Is analytic narrative a method or an approach? This important question re-
mainsunresolvedamongtheauthorsandconsequentlyisevadedorinconsis-
tently treated throughout the book.The commentaryauthors and othercrit-
ics note that there is dissonance between the claims of the introduction and
the content of the chapters.The dissonance is partly a reﬂection of an intro-
duction written as a manifesto versus chapters written to advance substan-
tive knowledge and analysis. But the dissonance runs deeper than that. Each
chapterestablishes that rational choice models can be used to organize a nar-
rative of important moments in history,yet none goes very far in establishing
how this can be done for moments other than those the chapter considers.
Carpenter, Skocpol, and Parikh argue convincingly that it is too early to
equateanalyticnarrativewithamethod.Asanapproach,analyticnarrativeis
most attractive to scholars who seek to evaluate the strength of parsimonious
causal mechanisms.The requirement of explicit theorizing compels scholars
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8Analytic Narratives Revisited 687
to make causal statements and, if the model is to be fullyexplicated, to iden-
tify a small number of variables.
The advantages of this approach are twofold. First, it provides the re-
searcherwithsomediscipline.Ifthemodelisimportant,thenarrativeshould
not rely overmuch on factors outside the model. Hence, an explicit theory
allows the scholar to distill the narrative. Second, research of this kind can
proceedbyiteration.Agivennarrativesuggestsamodelthatwhenexplicated
ought to have implications for the structure of relationships (the institutions)
withinwhichtheeventsoccurred.Thoseimplicationsforcethescholartore-
considerthenarrativeandthentoreevaluatetheextenttowhichkeyelements
of the narrative lie outside the proposed theory. If one must appeal too often
to forces outside the model, then the theory must be rejected. Analytic nar-
rative is therefore an inductive approach that challenges both the evidence
about the event of interest and theories that structure that evidence. Con-
sidered in this fashion, the volume delivers most of what the introduction
promises.
A second misdemeanor relates to the audiences that the volume aims to
address. As Skocpol rightly notes, the introduction is bold and ambitious,
while the chapters are narrower in scope and sometimes neglect important
literatures.We are pleased that Carpenter, Skocpol, and Parikh perceive our
work as relevant beyond the scope that we have given it and thus demand
greater intersection with other scholars. However, the combination of the
breadth of some of our topics and their condensation from larger projects
sometimes leads us to neglect arguments that are less signiﬁcant for the spe-
ciﬁcfocusoftheANchapters.Totakeaspeciﬁcexample,Rosenthalwrotehis
AN chapter foreconomic historians,who tend to overemphasize the distinc-
tions between early modern England and France and to downplay the funda-
mental ﬁscal conﬂicts that animated both societies. It is true, as Skocpol ar-
gues,thatthepoliticalandeconomicdivergencebetweenEnglandandFrance
has attracted a lot of attention beyond the authors Rosenthal cites, but these
scholars emphasize problems distinct from those Rosenthal seeks to explain.
Nonetheless,ifanalyticnarrativeistomatureasanapproach,itmustfol-
low an inclusive path, one that favors a dialogue with scholars of other ideo-
logical and methodological vantage points. To the extent that AN leads to
a conversation not just over the inclusion of explicit theorizing in a narra-
tive approach but over the substantive conclusions of the chapters, then we
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8688 Social Science History
have succeeded in furthering interdisciplinary dialogue.These articles leave
uswithagreaterawarenessofourresponsibilityinmaintainingandextending
this dialogue.
Narrative and Aesthetics
What,then,doesresearchsuchasoursrequire?Whereisthenarrative?What
constitutes the analytic?
Carpenter emphasizes the narrative side and suggests that beyond the
models, the chapters lack the rhythm of a narrative.The models, he argues,
interfere with the story and break the suspense, the uncertainty that would
holdtheattentionofthereader.Whileourapproachtonarrationmaybecon-
troversial, we want to emphasize the diﬀerence between aesthetics and eﬃ-
cacy. Storytelling does not always imply suspense.When we pick up a mys-
tery novel from a series with a recurring hero we know the hero will almost
invariably (a) survive and (b) solve the mystery. Hence, if those two questions
werekeytokeepingourattention,wewouldneverevenbeginthenovel.What
keeps us turning the pages, rather, is the question of what dangers the hero
faces and how the mystery will be solved. Keeping the reader alert through
suspense is a matter of aesthetics, not eﬃcacy. Suspense and intrigue seem
unlikely to be of import in ourchapters, since most of our readers know that
the Civil Waroccurred, that the English rather than the French had a Glori-
ous Revolution, or that mass conscription became an issue for modernizing
nineteenth-century states. Readers may not know of the International Cof-
fee Organization, and they may not know just how powerful and rich Genoa
once was. But the quality of narrative in social science should not depend on
what the reader knows any more than it did in classical tragedy. Carpenter’s
criticism underscores howanalytic narratives involve a trade-oﬀ between the
levelofdetailincludedandexplicitmodels.Theinclusionofanexplicitmodel
highlights the causal structure, which is precisely what we are interested in
and what we want to better understand.
PerhapsthisreactiontoCarpenterleanstoomuchonthespeciﬁcsofsus-
pense and not enough on his more general point—that the explicit theory
component of an analytic narrative necessarily forgoes many of the routine
literarydevices that help make many standard narratives compelling.To this
we plead guilty. Our narratives may hold the reader less ably, but we believe
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8Analytic Narratives Revisited 689
that the analytic rigor and clarity as to the mechanisms underlying histori-
cal change faroutweigh these costs. Indeed,we go further.The net costs run
in just the opposite direction from that emphasized by Carpenter. Rhetori-
cal and dramatic skills sometimes mask bad history.When historians have no
idea why something happened and use drama to move the storyalong, this is
a misuse of drama. For example,Weingast must explain why S. A. Douglas
and other Democratic leaders gave in to the South in the winter of 1853–54
and agreed to repeal the Missouri Compromise in the Kansas-Nebraska Act
of 1854.Theiraction represented the biggest political blunder for the Demo-
crats between the election of Andrew Jackson in 1828 and their defeat by
Abraham Lincoln in 1860.Why did they do it? Historians have no answer to
thisquestion;theyneverevenaskit.Theydescribelate-nightsecretmeetings
rather than oﬀer an explanation.
Our critics raise other issues with aesthetic overtones. Skocpol, for ex-
ample, faults us for a lack of elegance in highlighting our working approach,
and Parikh, especially in her verbal presentation, has taken us to task for fail-
ing to provide more of the sense of time and place that brings a narrative to
life. Since the purpose of this book, as distinct from the elaborated volumes
severalofourchaptersdrawupon,istoclarifythemethod,theskeletonisthe
message. Our idea of narrative has always included rich detail; several of us
engage in ﬁeldwork, and all delve deeply into archives and historical records.
But,again,thereisatrade-oﬀ,particularlyinchapter-lengthpieces,between
conveyingtherichnessofwhatwehavelearnedandthecausalargument.The
artofcombiningmodelingwiththesmellsandsoundsoftheeventsweareex-
plainingmaystilleludeus,butwevaluethecombination.Wehopethatfuture
scholars will be more successful than we seem to have been, at least in this
small book.
The commentators raise a number of substantive issues. Skocpol cor-
rectlyinsiststhatwegettheinstitutionsandhistoricalcontextright.Shepar-
ticularly takes Levi and Weingast to task on this score. Levi can certainly be
faulted for ignorance of James Geary’s excellent book (1991) and for failure
to report the votes in Congress, but she is not guilty of mis-specifying the
American institutions.Thevery point of herdiscussion is to explain the abo-
lition of commutation and the retention of substitution, and the explanation
lies solidly in the particular institutional features of the United States, espe-
cially its localism and lack of extensive bureaucracy.There is not even a dis-
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8690 Social Science History
agreement over the extent of actual class inequity. For Levi it is the percep-
tion, not the structural reality,of class discrimination that drives the analysis
and causes institutional change. Skocpol’s question is diﬀerent; her concern
is the relative fairness of Civil War recruitment versus that of later wars.
As Skocpol observes, Weingast’s chapter ignores a great many factors
leading to the Civil War. The chapter focuses on the balance rule in large
part because he believes this underlies many of the other elements that his-
torians view as independent factors. The chapter argues, for example, that
the sequence of disastrous choices by Democrats—including the infamous
Kansas-NebraskaAct,whichhelpeddestroythesecondpartysystemandset
thestagefortheriseoftheRepublicans—allreﬂectedtheunappreciatedlogic
compelling them to attempt to restore sectional balance.The critical feature
of the model is not congressional voting—on which rational choice theorists
are sometimes ﬁxated—but the fact that balance gave the South and hence
slaveholdersavetoovernationalpolicy.ThisvetohelpedmaintaintheUnion
for several generations, and its absence helped bring on the Civil War. Skoc-
pol errs, however, when she criticizes Weingast for ignoring that actors can
be‘‘blindsidedbymassivecontextualshifts.’’HisargumentabouttheDemo-
crats’ failure in the 1850s draws on exactly such a shift: they were blindsided
by what we nowclearly see as the end of the second party system, something
theyonlydimlyperceivedatthetime.Indeed,partofthereasonwesoclearly
understand this shift is that, in ignorance, they provoked such an extraordi-
nary political reaction.
Skocpol’s criticisms reﬂect the ongoing controversy between rationalists
and macrostructuralists as much as insights into particular ﬂaws in the argu-
ments. Parikh correctly takes us to task for treating the two approaches as
complementary rather than emphasizing their distinctive contributions and
clarifying the appropriate scope of each approach. If we had done as Parikh
requests, then some of the basis for Skocpol’s criticisms would have disap-
peared.
Carpenter raises an equally important and related question that we did
notconfront:whatisthescopeofananalyticnarrative?Ineﬀectheraisestwo
questions: one about subject area (can an analytic narrative be used to elu-
cidate political situations where voting occurs?) and one about method.We
strongly endorse the position that analytic narratives should have no bound-
aries with respect to subject or evidence.We see no good reason to limit ana-
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8Analytic Narratives Revisited 691
lytic narratives to areas of behavior where people possess the franchise or to
neglect voting information when it is relevant to the processes one seeks to
understand.With respect to method, one should not dwell overmuch on the
limits of analytic narratives as represented by the limited scope of the chap-
ters in the book. First,our restriction of models to extensive form games en-
hancestheunityofthevolumebutlimitstherangeofissuesweaddress.There
is still a vast set of problems susceptible to analysis, and an even larger set if
one is willing to go beyond game theory to include other formal or abstract
theorizing. Second, we focus our research on issues where we believe that
problems of randomness or contingency are not too severe. To take an ex-
ample, in Levi’s chapter governments solved their conscription problem in
the face of uncertaintyabout the occurrence of warand only partial informa-
tion about the reaction of draftees to changes in the rules. Because the re-
sponse of draftees requires coordination, one could imagine that the world
of conscription is unstable, with countries shifting the mechanisms they use
to staﬀ their armies from one year to the next based on ﬂuctuating social
norms of resistance. Had that been the case, Levi would probably not have
been drawn to write on the subject as an analytic narrative. She could have
treated each year independently and thus used traditional means to develop
and test the model of soldier procurement. For the purposes of our volume,
we focused on cases where there is some but hardly complete certainty in
the path of history, cases where the model helps us understand what is likely
to happen.We emphasize, however, that nothing about the method limits us
to cases of certainty or modest uncertainty. Extensive form games have long
been used to study settings of high uncertainty and contingency.
In fact, contingency is extremely important to our approach; in its ab-
sence there is little room for strategy.To take anotherexample,one could ar-
guethattheGloriousRevolutionwastheproductofcontingency,sinceitwas
the outcome of at least four diﬀerent processes that came together in early
1688: a fundamental ﬁscal conﬂict, a new heir to the throne, a threat to dis-
enfranchise most of the elite, and the marriage of the king’s possible succes-
sor to the ruler of the Low Countries.The argument could then proceed to
say that Rosenthal’s model does not elucidate what happened in 1688, for it
only encapsulates the ﬁrst of these four processes. Further, one could argue
that if a single one of the four had not been in place, there would have been
noGloriousRevolution,andEnglandwouldhaveevolvedadiﬀerentpolitical
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8692 Social Science History
regime. In particular,one can easily imagine that absent William of Orange’s
claim to the throne, England would have ended upwith a Catholic sovereign
and an absolutist government. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to put a primary
emphasis on the ﬁscal conﬂict, for it was concern over ﬁscal independence
that motivated James II to tamper with Parliament, and it was concern over
securing British ﬁscal resources for his coming conﬂict with Louis XIV that
compelled William to intervene in England. Such a primary emphasis does
not rule out contingency. Indeed, had there been no contingency, it is impos-
sible to make consistent the behaviorof James II in 1687–88 and the behavior
of the elite in 1688–89. If James was sure that the elite would get rid of him
if he acted to disenfranchise them, hewould not have tried to reshape Parlia-
ment in 1687. Similarly, if the elite had been sure that it would lose an armed
conﬂict to James, no revolt would have occurred in 1688. In other words, the
revolution could only have occurred because its outcome was uncertain.
The approach stands in sharp opposition to views of history that would
make the outcomes of events totally systematic or unsystematic in the ex-
treme. Our ideological position holds that understanding the institutional
context within which events occur helps us understand both how certain
events may happen and why they may happen.This is an ideological position
ratherthanamethodologicalpositionbecausethereisnothingperseingame
theory that rules out complete uncertainty—and proofs are few and far be-
tween.Yet if Greif’s chapter is a success, it is because the model helps him
to understand why the political equilibrium of the Podesta solved some im-
portant problems for Genoa and why the Genoesewere particularly likely to
adopt such a solution rather than an alternative (constitutional government
or autocracy).
Inallcaseswehavechosentoprivilegeparsimoniousmodels,oneswhere
the number of exogenous factors were a half dozen or less, so as to better
understand how changes in their value can aﬀect the institutional equilib-
rium. This aﬀects the narrative by reducing the importance of other vari-
ables for the story. For instance, for Bates one sort of uncertainty was criti-
cal: movements in the price of coﬀee. On the other hand, variations in U.S.
economic activity—however important they may be to theworld economy—
were much less salient. All narratives have to have an anchor (or set of an-
chors). Analytic narratives make their theoretical anchor more explicit (and
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8Analytic Narratives Revisited 693
thereby easier to criticize) than other accounts do.The requirement of a for-
mal model in noway limits the scope of uncertaintyorcontingency, nordoes
it obligate anyone to focus on game-theoretic models. In sum, if our ﬁrst mea
culpawasthatwehavebeentooambitious,oursecondisthatinotherdimen-
sions we have been too restrictive.
Models in Social Science
How do we transform an approach to problems into a research area in social
science? We argue that analytic narrative is a useful approach in a large num-
ber of settings. Parikh observes—as have many others—that save for the op-
portunism of coining a phrase, the book may be less novel than it appears.
We and other scholars have been creating analytic narratives for some time.
Yet, to Parikh’s dismay, there are few things worse than a bad analytic nar-
rative. It is therefore critical, she argues, that there be some rules as to how
ananalyticnarrativeshouldbeconstructed.Carpenterechoesthissentiment.
How is one to teach analytic narrative, and how is it to spread in the social
sciences, if it cannot be codiﬁed? In keeping with ouradmission that we seek
to characterize an approach rather than a method, we can only formulate a
few guidelines.
1. Avoid the use of oﬀ-the-shelf models unless they demonstrably en-
hance the explanatory project.While political scientists in particularare fond
of appealing to one of a small number of models (prisoner’s dilemma, battle
of the sexes, principal agent with moral hazard, principal agent with adverse
selection),thesemodelsareoftenveryuninformative.Theiranalysisdepends
on the context; each of these models can lead to eitheran eﬃcient solution or
an ineﬃcient one, to a problem solved or to a problem not solved. By under-
standing the context, the research scholar can build a model that is more ap-
propriate in that it captures institutional constraints.The constraints in turn
willalertustowhatsetofoutcomesispossible,tohowtheparticularproblem
faced by a society can be solved.
2.Take the theory seriously. Building a model that reﬂects the set of his-
toricalcircumstancesinwhichtheeventofinterestisembeddedrequiresthat
theresearcherdoasmuchwiththetheoryaspossible.Inparticular,themodel
should have two sets of results that allow the scholar to deepen the investiga-
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8694 Social Science History
tion.First,thereshouldbecomparativestaticresultsthatsuggestwhatmight
have happened in diﬀerent circumstances; these results are critical for com-
parative research. Second, the model contains assumptions that can be chal-
lenged to gain further insight. A third set of issues applies to game-theoretic
models: one must pay careful attention to the oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path be-
havior—whathappensalongthepathsnottakenoftendetermineswhatpaths
are taken. Because oﬀ-the-path behavior anchors the equilibrium, we must
have a very good sense of what the actors in the event we study think of what
will happen when things go wrong.
3.Take the narrative itself seriously in the sense of getting the details as
correct as possible and of providing richness to the extent appropriate. We
are not advocating just abstract models with examples but the kind of work
good economic and political historians do. The emphasis is on explanation
and evidence, but it is essential to actuallycapture the keycomponents of the
particular problem, place, and time under consideration. This may require
a combination of quantitative and qualitative evidence; it deﬁnitely requires
enough context to adequately account for the central strategic decisions.
4. Iterate between theory and data. While rational choice proponents
often emphasize the importance of deduction and hypothesis testing, we be-
lievethatmostsocialscienceresearch—includingrationalchoicescholarship
—is iterative and inductive.We begin all of our research with some basic in-
formation and some theoretical priors, then we accumulate new information
and formulate new models. In his chapter, Bates details this process, mov-
i n gf r o mam o d e lo fo l i g o p o l yt oam o d e lo fp o l i t i c a le c o n o m y .S u c har a d i c a l
change is evidence of how much we can learn by starting from one clearlyar-
ticulated vantage point, confronting it with the evidence, and then selecting
a new one. Iteration between theory and data also has implications for how
we conduct research. Each new model we adopt should be consistent with
what we know and should explicate what new data we still need. Accepting
theiterativeprocessdemandsthatweshedsomeofthearrogancethatrational
choice proponents have about deductive reasoning and its superiority.When
constructing the theory, social scientists often already know a lot about the
data/problem/case that they study.While this is true generally in social sci-
ence,itisevenmoreobviousinanapproachlikeanalyticnarrative,wherethe
theory must be embedded in the narrative.
T
s
e
n
g
 
2
0
0
0
.
1
1
.
1
4
 
1
0
:
4
6
 
D
S
T
:
0
6
2
3
7
 
S
O
C
I
A
L
S
C
I
E
N
C
E
H
I
S
T
O
R
Y
2
4
:
4
 
/
 
s
h
e
e
t
4
6
o
f
1
0
8Analytic Narratives Revisited 695
Conclusion
By its very nature AN is a perilous enterprise. Our essays implicitly argue
that we all carry an analytic narrative around with us in our research and
that making it explicit will help the research.We had hoped that the chap-
ters would demonstrate that analytic narrative has value twoways. First, be-
cause of its very sparseness, the model forces us to choose a simple ‘‘domi-
nant’’ causal framework and thus clarify the narrative. Second, an explicit
framework helps us to detect dissonance in the evidence, those facts or re-
lationships that do not ﬁt with the model and therefore deserve attention.
The symposium consists of scholars interested in comparative analysis and
big events, half of the audience that we sought to attract.The other half are
analytically minded economists and political scientists.The symposium au-
thors surprised us with their willingness to enter into a dialogue over issues
of substance and form. Daniel Carpenter, Sunita Parikh, and Theda Skoc-
pol’scritiquesencourageustoraiseourstandardsfurther.Theyrightlyinsist
that we must do more to deﬁne the craft of analytic narrative, to extend it be-
yond a set of historical cases, and to forge links with alternative approaches.
For each of these critiques we thank them.
Notes
Robert H. Bates is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government at Harvard Univer-
sity and Faculty Fellow of the Center for International Development. Among his recent
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